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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years a great, new scientific interest in human 
nature has developed. Formerly our best scholars and intellec-
tuals were devoted to studies which would provide men with greater 
material and cultural advantages, while man himself remained an 
unsearched mystery. But in the last fifty years this new inter-
est, whi~h in large part has been caused by the world-wide inse-
curity and unrest of our age, has made considerable progress in 
stUdies of man himself. There is genuine interest in the search 
for a more profound insight into our nature. 
A corresponding interest in the nature of man has arisen in 
the realm of pllilosophy. Existentia+ist philosophy clearly exem-
plifies this intense new personal app~oach to man. The present 
thesis may be conceived of as an attempt to catch a glimpse of 
this philosophical movement by studying the system of a modern 
~hilosopher who had a share in its development. 
No further explanation, then, seems necessary for undertaking 
the study of a philosopher of person. The purpose of the thesis 
is to examine and express the philosophy of Louis Lavelle from the 
~articular aspect of his theory of person and personality. Special 
~mphasi8 will be given to the notion of human freedom which is 
1 
2 
central in his philosophy of person. The treatment of Lavelle's 
philosophy will be from the aspect of its historical and doctrinal 
contexts, and will include a description of his fundamental 
themes. The second part of the thesis will emphasize the primary 
importance of freedom in Lavelle's philosophy of person. \Yhile 
Lavelle never undertook to explain his philosophy in this way, it 
is hoped that the results are something that would be acceptable 
to him. 
The bibliography comprises only the major books and articles 
written by or about Lavelle in p~ench and English (with two excep-
tions) which were available to the author. An exhaustive biblio-
graphy on Lavelle (which includes everything written by or about 
him up to mld-1957) has been published by Jean Ecole in his book 
on Lavelle's metaphysics. l 
Before beginning our study, it *111 be of interest tQ learn 
. 
something of the background, life, and characteristics of the 
philosopher whose system we are to study. Lavelle liked to recall 
with a smile the complaint of Charles Peguy that it is character-
istic of Parisians "not to have a country" (n'avoir E!! de ~). 
IJean Ecole, ~ Metaphysigue ~ l'etre ~ ~ philosophie 
~ Louis Lavelle (Phllosophes Contemporains), Editions Nauwelaerts, 
Paris, 1957, pp. 259-93. Partial bIbliographies are also to be 
found in the following places: Giornale £! Metafisica, VII (4) 
(Luglio-Agosto 1952), pp. 403-404; Les !tudes PhilosoEIligues, VI 
(Avril-Septembre 19$1), pp. l34-l37;-rrevue Tnomiste, II (1952), 
Pp. 157-159; and Beohara Sargi, La Participation i l'etre dans la 
~hIlosophle de Louis Lavelle (Paris, 1957), pp. Ib3-l66. ------
3 
The oount17 which Lavelle so loved was situated near Box-deaux in 
the extreme oonfines of Dordogne in P4rigard, France. Born an 
July 1$, 1883 at St. Martin de Villareal, Lavelle spent all his 
early years in near-by Parranquet. H. owned his family home 1n 
later year. and spent as much time there as possible. As if 
destinl marked this preference, 1 t was there he died after five 
. 2 
surfocating hours on the night at August, 31, 19$1. 
Atter studies at L,ana undep Hamelin, Lavelle received his 
Agresa de phl1osophie in 1909 and his Dooteur-es-Lettrea in 1922 
from the Unlveraity at Stra.bourg. During the First World War, 
which Interl"Upted his atudi •• , Lavelle was a prisonep of the 
Germans. When the war ended he served as a professor in several 
lyc8es at Condorcet. Pram 1932 to 1934 he taught a course in 
general philosoPhy at the Borbanne. Following this he lectured 
with great success at the Unlv.rai t7 :,of Bordeaux untIl, In 1940, 
he was made Inspector General at PublIc EducatIon. In December 
of 1941 he auoceeded LeRoy and Bergson In the highly prized 
~rofessorship at the Collage de France. During his entire philo-
lIoph1oal oareer and right up until his death, Lavelle wrote many 
2.ene I.e Senne, "Louis, LaVelle,· Glomale !!.M,tati8ica, VII 
(4) (LuS11o-AgOlto 19.$2), 401. fh1a memor1al article b7 Lavelle'. 
~lo8e triend and associate has manJ interest1ngdeta1ls and 
~n.ights into' Lavelle's lite and philosoph,. See allo Georges 
PaVI, -Lou1. Lav,lle," Lea Stude. ftt10sgph1guea, XII (h) (Octobre. 
Pec_bra 19.$1), 319-.326, and Xt!I (janVier-lars 19S8), IS-31, 
itOI' biographical detaIls of Lavelle fa 11te and a sketch of hia 
!Who 1. 17. taD and works. 
4 
books and articles, and he contributed to numerous conferences in 
Cologne, Brussels, and the School for Higher Studies at Ghent. In 
all of his writings, perhaps most notably in La philosophie fran-
x9.ise antre ~ deux guerres (Paris, 1942) and Traite des valeurs, 
I (Paris, 1951), Lavelle shows a penetrating knowledge of the 
systems of both modern and classical philosophers. 
In his years of study and teaching, Lavelle developed a 
profound philosophy, both personal and traditional, not by con-
sciously reacting against the tendencios of his own age, but seem-
ing to ignore them, by pursuing his own road. Vincent Smith has 
characterized him as "[o]ne of the greatest metaphysicians of our 
day ••• [whoJ has driven deeply enough into the real to find a 
point of intersection for whatever is positive and salutary in 
modern philosophy."3 
An interesting result followed tram Lavelle's tendenQY to 
independent thought. In 1921 he presented his doctoral theses 
on La dialectigue du monde sensible and L! perception visuelle de 
~ profondeur before an academic jury of the University of Stras-
bourg. In spite of a brilliant defense, the reception he received 
was plainly reserved, and to the general surprise of his fellow 
students, he received only the note "good" and was awarded the 
equivalent of a ~ for his work. Perhaps he made the mistake of 
3Vincent Edward Smith, Idea-Men 2! Today (Milwaukee, 1950), 
p. 345. 
5 
affirming the originality of his thought in too forceful a manner, 
failing to have sufficient recourse to the masters of recognized 
authority. At any rate, because of this, he never occupied a 
Chair of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, since these are held only by 
those whose doctoral theses merit the equivalent of an A. 
Lavelle had an extremely dignified personality. He seemed 
even a little majestic as he slowly moved his big body (which 
expanded a bit towards the end of his life). His words were 
grave and very correct, his speech slow and care~~l. When he 
spoke, his right arm kept time with the cadonce of his words.4 
The clarity and precision of Lavelle's expression was especially 
remarkable. His limpid style, appearing to flow from a spring 
which was never either turbid or dry, was a conquest rather than 
a gift. His thought was the expression of a personality which, 
although reserved, was always ready to give itself.5 Some have 
• 
" 
even considered his engaging style worthy of caution lest the 
reader, caught off guard, be fascinated by harmonious, fluid, 
4Information from a letter of December 9, 1957 to the author 
from Pare Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., Professor of Philosophy at 
College Notre-Dame de la Paix, Namur, Belgium. (Translation mine.) 
F'or further interesting personal details about Lavelle, see 
Diogene, t'Louis Lavelle, Uomini lett!," Giornale di Metafisica, 
XII (6) (Novembre-Decembre 1957), 735-752.--
5Jean Lacroix, "Un philosophe du consentement," [Louis 
Lavelle], Lumiere et Vie, VII (1952), 105-121. Translation frOM 
Dom. Illtyd Trethowan~A Philosopher of Acceptance: Louis 
Lavelle," Downside Review, LXXI (1953), [372-386J, J73. This 
article will afterwards be referred to as "Lacroix. I 
-6 
and somewhat exaggerated expressions which please the ear but 
render him a bit uncritical. 6 
With all of Lavelle's winning qualities, we must acknowledge 
the fact that he has not been too widely known outside of France. 
How can this be explained? Pere Troisfontaines atte!l1pts an 
answer to this question when, after referring to the "luminous 
synthesis" of T.Javelle's philosophy, he writes: "But ••• the 
search for an absolute point of view, almost from outside con-
crete experience, Is directly against the grain of the contem-
porary trend in modern philosophy. This, I think, explains the 
little influence exorcised by Lavelle on Prench thouCht (whatever 
may be, in other respects, his intrinsic value). The atheists 
and materialists do not care for his persona.list spiritualism; 
the Christians find him a bit too 'traditional,' a bit too 
crystalized, too 'classical,."7 
Lavelle was not a Catholic; he was Protestant by birth but 
was detached from any practice. However he considered himself a 
Christian and refers frequently to the importance of Christianity 
6N• J. J. Balthasar, "L'univocite non immanente de l'etre 
totale," Giornale di Metafisica, VII (4) (Luglio-Agosto 1952), 
447. See also IreMe Chevalier, O.P., "AperQu sur la philosophie 
de ~t. Lavelle, If Revue Thomi ste, XLV (Juillet-Septembre 1939), 509-
533. Chevalier also quotes from M. Leroux's article in the Bulle-
~ de la Societe franzaise (Juillet-Septembre 1936), p. 176, to 
the same effect. 
7Inforrnation from a letter of December 9, 1957 to the aut'lor 
from Pere Roger Troisfontaines, S.J., Professor of Philosophy at 
College Notre-Dame de la Paix, Namur, Belgium. ('rranslation mine.) 
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on hls thoueht (without which he would have devolved into a sort 
of pantheism.)R Indeed, his inseparable friend, Rone Le Senne, 
remarks that by recalling the continuous, actual, vivifying daily 
presence of God in our experience (through his univocal concept 
uf being), Lavelle manifests a "Catholic sensibility.,,9 
The content of Lavelle's philosophy we will see more clearly 
in our discussion of his basic philosophical themes in Chapter 3. 
We may oonclude this introductory ohapter by quoting from the 
Inaugural Leoture which Lavelle delivered at the Coll~ge de France 
when he assumed the Chair of Philosophy. He gave apt and memorabl 
expression to his own philosophical ideals when he said: "To seek 
the absolute in oneself and not outside oneself, in the most 
intimate, profound, and personal experience, but an absolute in 
which we can only participate, which establishes our very exist-
enoe in an ever-renewed oommunicationwith all beings by the 
interMediation of all things; ••• such are the demands of Prench 
thought to which we intend to remain loyal. It is not in avoid-
ing: contact with the absolute, but in trying to rediscover it in 
all the events of our lives that we shall give them their true 
signific ance t and this will make us cap1:ible of appreci:-l ting the 
weight of our burden and of accepting it. 1110 
8~. 
9Le Senne, p. 421. 
10Lacroix, pp. 372-373. 
CHAPTER II 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF LAVELLE'S PHILOSOPHY 
In seeking to understand the philosophy of Louis Lavelle, it 
will be profitable to consider what currents or streams of 
thought, common in the histories of philosophy, best describe the 
place he occupies in the modern philosophical world. 
The whole of the contemporary philosophical world has been 
viewed as a product of the three schools of existentialism, Marx-
1 ism, and personalism. But a still closer perspective of 
Lavelle's thought can be obtained by considering him in the light 
of existentialism, philosophy of spirit, and personalism. Each of 
these requires a brief description; their full pertinence, how-
ever, will be seen in the following chapter when the main doctri-
• 
nal points of Lavelle's philosophy ar~ discussed. 
Existentialism 
According to existentialism, the principal problem of philos-
ophy is that of our concrete existence. Why do we exist? What 
is our purpose or goal? More simply, what does it mean for us to 
lSee Jean-Marie Grevillot, Les grands courants de la pensee 
contemporaine (Paris, 1947). 
8 
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exist?2 In its emphasis on this aspect of reality, existentialism 
is a reaction of the philosophy of man against the excesses and 
3 imperaonalism of philosophies of reason, ideas, and things. The 
approach to reality by reason alone is through discursive and 
~istorical, systematic methods. It For the existentialist, this 
approach is inadequate since it does not explain and elucidate 
the more intimate aspects of our existence which, though less 
tangible, are no less real. 
The initiator of modern existentialism is the Danish S~ren 
Kierkegaard, who lived in the first half of the last century. He 
viewed every individual as an original, unique being who is 
isolated from the guidance of universal principles and who is 
unaided by thought and speculation, which are on a different level 
from individuality. In his conscious opposition to Hegelian 
rationalism, Kierkegaard strove to see the supreme reality of the 
universe in indiViduals. Existentiali'sm today is essentially the 
same, though it has developed and been variously modified. 
In the care~llly chosen words of Pere Jolivet, existentialism 
2 Ibid., p. 13. 
3Emmanuel Mounier, Esprit, Avril, 1946. (Cited in Grevillot, 
p. 13.) ('rranslation mine.) A footnote on page 14 of Grevillot 
gives Mounier's division of existentialism into twelve principal 
themes. 
4Vincent Edward Smith, Idea-Men 2! Todaz (Milwaukee, 1950), 
pp. 248-249. 
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is "the collection of doctrines according to which philosophy has 
for its object the analysis and description of concrete existence, 
considered as an act of liberty which is constituted by self-
affirmation and which has no other origin or foundation than this 
affirmation of self."5 Lavelle himself described existentialism 
as a system which implies that each of us is a being who is cast 
alone in tho world with his own personal abilities which he must 
discover and actualize.6 
In his Court traite de l'exiatence, Jacques flaritain distin-
£"uishes two fundamental forms of existentialism. 'rhe one, he 
says, "affirms the primacy of exIstence, but as implying and 
preserving essences or natures, and as manifesting the supreme 
victory of the intellect and intelligibility." This he considers 
authentic existentialism, the existentialism of St. filomas. The 
other "affirms the primacy of existe:Q.ce, but as destroying or 
abolishing essences or natures and as 'nlanifesting the supreme 
defeat of the intellect and of intelligibility."7 
5Regis Jolivet, Les doctrines existentialistes (Abbate Saint-
',Vandrille, 1948), p. 247 "l'enaemble des doctrines d'apres 
lesquelles la philosophie a pour objet l'analyse et 180 description 
de l'exlstence concr~te, consideree comme l'acte d'une liberte qui 
se constltue en staffirmant et nta d'autre genese ou d'autre 
fondament que cette affirmation de sol." (Translation mine.) 
6Louls Lavelle, Introduction a l'ontolo8ie (Paris, 1947), 
p. 36. 
7Jacques Marltain, Court traite ~ 1 'existence (Paris, 1947), 
p. 13. (English version cited is from translation: Existence and 
the Existent by Louis Galantiere and Gerald B. Phalen (!~ew York;--
I"91"i8) , p. j.] 
11 
Viewed in another way, existentialism can be seen to havo 
two distinct currents. TI~re is the atheistic, nihilistic strain, 
to which philosophers like J. -p. Sartre and r~artin lieideer-er 
bolong. They view man as surrounded by nothingnes8, standinG in 
hn;,,:uish ar,ains t pure ot'1erness; and since thc::-e is only not:ling-
ness to clarify life, they despair of all nearlinp; and value. "!'he 
t~elstic current in existentialism, however, visible in Karl 
Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel among others, taJces a posl tive outlook 
and emphasizes mants openness to tho '£ranscencient in nature. 
'rhese philosophers take a dynamic view of existence, considering 
it the means by which man realizes himself. 'rhe "Philosophy of 
Action" of Maurice Blondel is a clear example of this. This 
positive and open approach to reality can be reGarded partly as 
a reaction against positivism and partly as a reaction against 
the reduction of relision to social morality. It asserts the 
• 
Transcendent after a reconsideration of personal experience and 
its i:rnplications. 8 
Lavelle, who is certainly in the existentialist movement, 
is also well \vithin its theistic current. According to his 
philosophy I can discover and realize myself only in association 
with God, whom Sartre donies, and without whom, according to 
8Fredr1ck Copleston, S.J., Contemporary Philosophy (London, 
19.5 6), p. 109. 
-12 
Lavelle, I would be nothing. 9 The third chapter will more 
fully explain Lavelle's concept of being, and discuss the all-im-
portant place he gives to participation. 
Existentialism, however, when viewed in its tota.l context, 
i3 a philosophy that affirMS the primacy, or priority, of exist-
ence; and this priority is affirmed in relation to the traditional 
Platonic emphasis on essence. The philosophy of Louis Lavelle has 
been viewed as a neat synthesis of these two possibilities. For 
him, as for the existentia.lists, existence in man precedes 
essence; but--and in this he agrees with the essentialists--it is 
his essence, or what he is, and not his existence, or the fact of 
being, that constitutes the value of man.10 
Thus it is that many authors agree in creating a new division 
of existentialism for Lavelle's philosophy; they consider his 
philosophy an "essentialist existent~alism.1I In his work Het 
spiri tualis tisch l!:xistentlalisme !.!!! Louis Lavelle, M. Delfgaauw 
notes that Lavelle has joined a metaphysical tradition which 
defines the relation of existence and essence. He cites a letter 
in which Lavelle states that existonce is given to us precisely 
so that we can acquire an essence and come to know our individual 
9 Jean Ecole, "L' exis -tentialisme de Louis Lavelle, If Revue 
rhomiste, LII (2) (1952), 390. (Translation mine.) 
10paul Foulquie, Existentialism (London, 1948), p. 12. ['This 
English translation was made from the first F'rench edi tion by 
Kathleen Raine.] 
13 
eXIstence.1l Lavelle adds that he has never rejected t.he notion 
of an ideal essence, but rat~er considers it a mediatrix between 
pure being and individual eXistence. 12 
Philosonhy of SRiri~ 
In the past twenty-five years there has arisen in France a 
peculiar philosophy under the name of Philosophy of Spirit. In-
terest in the realm of the spirit, of course, is not new in 
France, nor new in this century. It can, in fact, be easily 
traced in }f'rench philosophers back through Maine de Biran and 
Descartes. Vincent Smith sees an even more ancient source when 
he writes that the Socratic spirit and even the Socratic method 
has, to a certain extent, been renewed today by the group in 
France promoting the philosophy of spirit.13 Three main prin-
ciples characterize this movement: a return to the absolute; a 
• 
consideration of all human experienco;and a consideration of all 
the spiritual tendencies which require the comprehension of the 
hQ~an person. 14 The three most influential figures in the 
11M• Delfgaauw, ~ spiritualistisch existentialisme ~ 
Louis Lavelle (Amsterdam, 19r~7), p. 125. This is quoted in 
Jolivetts ~ doctrines existentialistes in a footnote on page 21. 
l2~. 
13Smith, p. 333. See also ~ile Brahier, TransformatiJn de 
la philosophie franiaise (Paris, 1950), Chapltre XVI: "Permanence 
dU aplritualisme, It pp. 207-219. 
141. M. Bochenski, La phi1osophie contemporains en europe, 
(Paris, 1951), p. 178. (Traduit par Fran~ois Vaudou.r-
-movement of the philosophy of spirit which continues the Vr'el1.ch 
traditions of spiritualism that Bergson eMbraced, are GabrIel 
Marcel, Rene Le Senne, and Louis Lavelle .15 One might call their 
doctrines a "spiritual existentialism." According to Lavelle, 
there is no metaphysics of the objective; metaphysics ought to 
be rather the science of spiritual intimacy. He finds the idea 
of being in this intimacy, and will show by a kind of ontological 
argument that this idea contains a reality.16 
As Lavelle himself has written, the philosophy of spirit has 
marked in Franoe an effort of resistance against all the doctrines 
which oultivate anguish and despair in the soul, instead of trying 
to surmount them; doctrines w:hich regard !lothlngness (neant) fLj 
more profound thxn beinv (etre). The nihilist philonophers 
remain satisfied wi th a sentiment of' our subjection to the body; 
and instead of trying to free us from it, they cause us tQ labor 
to engage ourselves in the temporal servitudes from which it was 
the ~oal of ancient wisdom to free us. 17 The philosophy of 
spirit seeks to restore the respect and love of spiritual values 
of which, they say, the hi~hest form has been reached in the 
15Smith, p. 334. 
16Bochenski, p. 178. 
17Louis Lavelle, "Preface" to M. F. Sciacca's L'existence de 
~ (Paris, 1951), p. 8. --
-15 
course of history by a "synthesis of Platonism and Christian-
ity. fl 18 The difference which separates true spiritualism from 
critical philosophy is that the former gra.sps act immediately in 
its very occurence, while the latter finds act through induction. 
In a private letter to M. Sciacca, Lavelle wrote: "I can 
only renew the expression of our agreement on the principle of 
defense of the spirit, of metaphysics and of a Christian Platon-
ism in which one can find that alliance between the reality of 
the idea and the value of the person which doubtless constitutes 
the very essence 2! spiritualism.,,19 Whatever difficulties may 
lurk in their formal statements, the spirit of these philosophers 
echoes sympathetically in the hearts of genuine philosophers. 
Sartre may have hit the headlines, but spiritual existentialism 
has come inspiringly olose to hitting the truth. 20 
Personalism 
Personalism is a philosopby; it is not merely an attitude, 
nor is it a system. In tbe broadest sense, personalism is a way 
of thinking that makes persona.lity the key to all philosophical 
problems. It maintains that ~ £.it is to be a person or self. In 
18Ibid • The relations between Lavelle and Platonism will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
19Cited by M. F. Sciacca, tiDal mio carteggio con Louis 
Lavelle," Giornale £!. Metafisica, VII (4) (Luglio-Agosto 1952), 
490. (Translation and italics mine.) 
20 Smith, p. 370. 
16 
the personalist world if one poses the question: "What does it 
mean to be?" (the fundamental problem in philosophy since Parmen-
ides), one prime fact imposes itself. It is that for me, to be 
means to think, to be conscious. 21 
The term "personalismtl is of recent usage. F}nployed in 1903 
by the French philosopher Renouvier to describe his philosophy, it 
then fell into disuse. Vfhen it reappeared in France towards 1930, 
there was a very different climate of thought, and the term was 
used to designate the first researches of the review Esprit and 
of some neighboring groups (Ordre Nouveau) concerning the polit-
ical and spiritual crisis then arising in Europe. 22 The concept 
of personalism today, however, is by no means a novelty. The 
universe of the person is the universe of man, and the personal-
ism of the modern world is grafted onto a long tradition which 
some like to traoe back even to Socre-tes' "Know thyself. tl 
"The fundamental affirmation of personalism is 'the existence 
of free created persons'. But it is not a gratuitous metaphysical 
affirmation; it is a principle of human action and of meaning for 
people who take a common attitude in viewing man. tt23 The person 
2lFor a fuller treatment of the general notions of personal-
ism see Emmanuel Mounier, Le personnalisme (Paris, 1951), Intro-
ductory chapter: "Introduction Familiere a l'univers Personnel," 
pp. 5-17. [English translation by Philip [,"airet: Personalism 
(New York, 1952), pp. vii-xx.) 
22 Mounier, p~ vii. (English edition, p. 5.] 
23Roger Daval, Histoire des idees en france (Paris, 19j6), 
p. 109. (Translation mine.) --- --
17 
is not an object to be regarded, but rather a center of reorien-
tation for an objective universe. 24 Because of the uniqueness of 
every individual person, there is at the heart of personalism a 
principle of unpredictability which excludes any desire for a 
definitive system. 
What has been thus far described is distinctive of French 
personalism, of which Mounier and the periodical Esprit are the 
chief representatives. There, the personalists make a great 
point of applying their doctrine in the political and social 
fields. Mounier opposes personalism to extreme individualism and 
its opposite of totalitarianism or extreme collectivism. Individ-
ualism is abhorred as bringing about the centralization of the 
indi vidual in himself, wherear: t!;e first condi tion of personalism 
is hif:.l decentralization ~.:: ol-.der to set him in the open perspec-
tives of personal life. In oppositi~n to individualism and to 
• 
whatever idealism still persists, pers'onalism demonstrates that 
the human subject cannot be nourished by auto-digestion; that one 
can possess only so much as one gives, or only that to which one 
~ives oneself; and no one ean find salvation, either spiritual 
or social, in himself. 26 
Mounier does not consider personalism a form of spiritulllism, 
24Mounier, Personnalisme, p. 17. [English edition, p. xx.] 
25Ibld. , p. 37. [English edition, p. 19. ] 
26Ibid • , p. 39. [English edt tion, p. 21. ] 
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despite the name of personalism's chief organ (Esprit). He sees 
in spiritualism a doctrine "which plays at being pure spirits" 
(gui joue ~ esprits purs). This, however, is not true of all 
spiritualism, as, for example, the spiritualism of Descartes, 
which attaches importance to the union of body and soul. But, 
with many others, Mounier merely wishes to place the emphasis on 
incarnation, on ffthat being compounded of light and blood" (ill 
" "" 1 ' ) .!E.!:!. !1!!.1.!!!2. urni ere !.l des ang • He believes in the primitive 
character of experience of the second person, you, which precedes 
the 1. For him too, through affirmation of Transcendence, the 
person is orientated to the essentials of Christianity which 
affirms both transcendence and incarnation.27 
"The personalist type of philosophy tends to recur as a 
protest or reaction against the recurrent forms of monism or 
'totalitarian' philosophy which are felt to threaten the dignity 
and individual value of the human pers.on. One might call'it the 
periodic protest of the personal against the impersonal.,,28 In 
this context, however, the words "protest" and "reaction" are not 
meant to imply that personalism is something negative. Rather, 
it involves a positive affirmation and interpretation of person-
ality. A personalist civilization is one whose spirit and 
structu.re is ordered to the fulfillment as a person of each one 
27Brehier, p. 218. 
28Copleston, p. 105. 
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who constitutes it. 29 
We turn now to a brief look at personalism as it exists and 
is understood outside of France. There are in personalism two 
main tendencies. One is towards an organic view of society, as 
in Fichte and Hegel; the other (more typical) is democratic and 
reformist and is represented by Kant, Bowne, Mounier, and 
Maritain. "The tendency of this latter group is to test social 
systems by their treatment of the individual person, and thus 
to emphasize political democracy, to criticize existing systems 
of ownership and distribution in so far as they fail to respect 
personality, and to make speoific applications of personalism to 
problems of labor and management, war and peace, and the like.,,30 
Although for convenienoe we speak of "personalism" in the 
singular, we ought really to say that there is a plurality of 
personalisms. A Christian personalism and an agnostic person-
• 
alism, for instance, differ in their most intimate dispositions 
or attitudes. Nevertheless, because they conform to one. another 
in certain realms of thought and in certain lines of practical 
conduot concerning the individual or collective order, we are 
sufficiently justified in using the same name to describe their 
2qc~_ 1 M i Ma if t ·~I~anue oun er, I n es e ~ service ~ personnalisme 
(Paris, 1936), p. 62. 
30Edgar Sheffield Brightman, "Personalism" in A History 
2£ Philosophical Systems, ed. Vergillus Ferm, fNew York, 1950), 
p. 350. 
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tenets. 31 
Almost all the European personalisms can be called Christian 
personalisms. They have Christianity for ~~eir central inspira-
tio~. M. Maritain has written that the notion of person is a 
notion of Christian index which is disentangled and made more 
precise by theology.32 Within the strong current of Christi~l 
personalism are found the inspiration and elements which have 
contributed to form the philosophy of Louis Lavelle. 
31Mounier, Personnalisme, p. 6. [English edition, p. viii.] 
32Jacques Maritain, Humanisme integral, p. 17. Cited in 
Grevillot, Les grands courants 4! la pensee contem~oraine (Paris, 
1947), p. 10;7 See also Grovillot, Chapter III: Le personnal-
isme chretien,tr pp. 16$-274, for a full treatment of Christianity 
and personalism. 
CHAPTER III 
BASIC DOCTRINES OF LAVELLE'S PHILOSOPHY 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a general view of 
the philosophy of Louis Lavelle in its more important aspects. 
Obviously, the attempt to encompass the entire philosophy of a 
man within a single brief chapter is hopeless. Lavelle's own 
attempt fills more than twenty books. It has consequently been 
necessary to select and choose only those aspects which are 
essential to his philosophy and which aid in understanding his 
concepts of person and personality. 
As has been noted, Lavelle's philosophy can be considered as 
a convergence of existentialism, philosophy of spirit, and person-
alism. This will now be considered fncloser detail. Beg-inning 
with a general d~scription of his philosophy, we will go on to 
describe his initial fact, the notions of being, act, and univoc-
ity in Lavelle, his doctrines of participation and Platonism, 
and finally, accusations of pantheism made against his philosophy. 
General Description 2! Lavelle'S Philosophy 
A first contact with the philosophic work of M. Lavelle may 
well be disconcerting. Philosophers customarily begin with 
immediate data of sense, the world, and facts of consciousness, 
21 
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and ascend from this point to (}od. Lavelle, hov/ever, ins taIls 
himself instead at t!ie very center of all things, from which he 
proceeds to develop a coherent metaphysical explanation of reality 
For him, being is an act (actus), a real experience and a personal 
accomplishment. The initial act or experience of being is inter-
nal knowledge of self, and has the character of an immediate 
possession. By asserting that being is "self-Justifying," Lavelle 
wants to affirm its spontaneous and undivided character since he 
holds that being gets its meaning from itself and not, as for so 
many modern philosophers, from nothingness. "'rhe immediacy of 
union between being and evidence • • • is expressed in the 
principle that being has no other end but itself. tIl A" thing, tI 
for Lavelle, becomes a "being" when it is brought into active 
consciousness in this internal experionce. 
From this starting point Lavelle goes on to assert that 
being is not only one but is univocal," and that by our proper 
act we are more and more discovering ourselves through an ever-
increasing participation in tho All, who is God. Lavelle has 
thus definitely established himself in the Platonic tradition, 
which he considers the only authentic source of the true "philos-
ophia perennis." From what has just been described it is not 
difficult to understand why Lavelle has been accused of pantheism. 
nis effective refutation of this interpretation will be described 
.t~Vincent Edward Smith, Idea-Men 2! Today (Milwaukee, 1950), 
p. 3,+7. 
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further on. 
In ~ l'etre, Lavelle has written that there are only two 
philosophies from which one can choose: that of Protaeoras, 
according to which man is the measure of all things, and that of 
Plato, in which the measure of all things is not man but God, a 
God, however, who permits himself to be participated by man. 2 
'Ehis gives us a good idea of Lavelle's basic orientation. But to 
prevent misunderstanding, Lavelle assures his reader that, far 
from reducing philosophy to an idealist immanentism, he uses the 
word "participation" precisely to show that the immanent always 
proceeds from the Transcendent; and circling back in a sort of 
dialectic, it serves to draw up into the Transcendent all the 
elements of knowledge and action.3 
Lavelle is often criticized for having engaged in " a purely 
logical game" (B!! pur j eu logigue). ~Gabriel rvr.arcel spoke .in this 
way of him in the Nouvelli, Revue Frani~lse for F'ebruary, 1938.4 
This reproach addressed to the Lavellian method is serious, espe-
cially today when philosophical thought is dominated by a sharp 
2Louis Lavelle, De l'etre (Paris, 1947), p. 35. 
3Louis Lavelle, Letter of May 20, 1946 to M. F. Sciacca. 
Cited Oy Sciacca in "Dal mio carteggio con Louis Lavelle," Giorn-
ale di Metafisica, VII (4) (Luglio-Agosto 1952), 489. 
4Gabriel Marcel, "Compte rendu du livre De l'acte," Nouvelle 
Bevue I<'ran9aise, fevrier, 1938, 217-218. Cited by b. R. Loza, 
"Climat et methodo de la philosophie de Lavelle," Melanges de 
Sciences Religieuse, XI (1954), 212. --
concern for the concrete and animated by a deliberate prooccupa-
tion for remaining in contact wi-(ih the universe in which we live. 
If this divergence in attitude really exists between Lavelle and 
modern philosophers, it remains for us to conclude not merely 
that the doctrine of Lavelle does not respond to the needs of our 
times, but also and especially that it is not truly comprehensive 
of all the given, and of all the real.> 
To answer this difficulty adequately, it must be noted that 
hwnan existence can be envisaged on two planes: that of pheno-
menological description and that of metaphysics. Modern philos-
ophers are accustomed, in general, to a phenomenological desorip-
tion; Lavelle, on the other hand, resolutely brings his attention 
to metaphysics. If one stUdies only the expression and presen-
tation of Lavelle's system, his "dialectic of the eternal present" 
appears to be an attempt at evasion G.~ .the real world. But if, 
under the appearanoes, one seizes the basic intuition which 
inspires Lavelle's writings, understanding that for him being is 
an act, and each of our limited acts is a participation in the 
Act who is God, then the previously obscure elements of Lavelle's 
philosophy become clear. One thus finds that the authentic and 
full sense of existence and the world have their true aspect 
within the metaphysical orientation which Lavelle adopts. 6 
pp. 212-214. 
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~ Initial ~ 
Lavelle, as has been shown, finds his initial fact in an 
act, the act of being. His primitive fact may be described as 
If act accomplishing itself," "being realizing itself, II !, Belf-
consciousness," or in existentialist terms, as udecisiont! or 
"consent. TI In his own inimitable style he has expressed himself 
thus: "There is an initial experience which is contained in all 
the others and which gives to each of them their weight and depth: 
it is the experience of the presence of being. To affirm this 
presence is to affirm simultaneously one's participation in being • 
• • .. The peculiar quali ty of philosophic thought is to attach 
itself to this essontial experience, to refine its acuteness, to 
retain it when it nearly escapes, to return to it when all is 
obscure and one has need of Ii landmark and a touchstone, to ana-
lyze its content and to show that al~ our operations depend on it, 
• 
finding in it their origin, reason, ana source of power. 1t7 'rhus 
at the origin of all thought Lavelle finds a primitive experienc~ 
which is that of the subject coming to understand himself as 
7Louis Lavelle, La presence totale (Paris, 1934), pp40 25-26: 
"II y a une experienc;-initiale qui est Impliquee dans toutes les 
autres et qui donne a chacune d'elles sa gravite et sa profondeur: 
c'est l'experience de 180 presence de l'etre. Reconna!tre cette 
~resence, c'est reconna1tre du mema coup la participation du moi 
a l'etre •••• Le propre de la pensee phllosophique est de 
s'attacher a cette experience essentielle, d'en affiner l'acuite, 
de Ie. retenir quand elle est pres d'echapper, dty retourner quand 
tout s'obscurit et que l'on a besoin d'une borne et d'une pierre 
de touche, d'analyser son contenu et de montrer que toutes nos 
operations en dependent, trouvent en elle leur source, leur raison 
d'~tre et Ie rinci e d -u u "T 
"..-
---------------------------------------------------------------. 
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being, that is, as forming a part of being. 
The original fact 1s such that I can neither posit being 
independently of the self which grasps it, nor can the self be 
posited independently of tile being upon which it is inscribed. 
Lavelle elaborates this in his book on being, where he writes that, 
if the initial experience is the experience of participation 
tllrough which the ego constitutes the existence which is proper 
to it, there is obviously a twofold. aspect in this initial exper-
ience, and neither aspect can be considered as isolated from the 
other. The first aspect is that of pure lli, or the act which is 
only act, while the second aspect is that formed by the world, 
where the infini"Cy of act manifests itself in the infinity of 
choices and states which seem born of the participation itself. 
Lavelle considers the world the "interval" that separates pure 
act (God) from the act of participation (ourselves).8 
Lavelle's las t published article ':is helpful for a better 
unders tanding of this all-impor ',,~,~', c discovery of being in his 
thought. In it he said: 
Our firs t phil,osophic discovery, as undoubtedly that 
of all men when their reflection has be~un to come 
into play, has been that of our proper existence in 
the face of a universe which up till then has exclus-
ively rets,ined all our attention, but as a pure spec-
t9.cle. But the discovery of oneself is the extraor-
dinary discovery of a being which participates in the 
being of the whole, but in such a way that he is this 
BLavelle, De l'3tre, p. 23. 
being instead of just seeing it, that in speak-
ing of it he can say 1 or !!!!.i that he has control 
over it and, instead of regarding it from without, 
he makes it come into existence from within •••• 
As my first experience was that in which the 
spectacle of the world was in no way abolished but 
rather abandoned in favor of an act which was entirely 
interior, aware of its pure determinability and its 
pure exercise, so the second experience was that of 
time in which my life was flowing on and which was not 
denied but rather rooted in a present coextensive with 
Being in which that time itself was the foundation of 
its own reality •••• 
A third experience, which was to give the pre-
ceding two all their value, was that which Plato no 
doubt early experienoed, namely, that the world we 
live in is not that of things which we see, but the 
world of thoughts whioh we have. Each one of us 
lives and dies in the world of his thoughts rather 
than in the world of thInr,s.9 
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9Louis Lavelle, "Temoitage," Les l!:tudes Philosophigues, VI 
(1951), 129-130: ~ 
"Notre premIere decouverte philosophique, comme oelle de tous 
les h<:~es sans doute des que leur r~flexion a commens.,e'a s'exer-
cer, a ete oelle de notre propre existence en face d ' .. univers qui jusque la avait retenu exclusivement toute notre attention, mais 
oomme un spectacle pur. Or, la decouverte de soi, c'est cette 
decouverte extraordinaire d'un etre qui participe a l'etre de tout 
mais de telle maniere que cet 3tre, ~ l'est au lieu de le voir, 
qu'en parlant de lui, il peut dire ~ ou m2!, qu'il~en a la charge 
et qu'au lieu de le regarder du dehors, il le fait etre du dedans. 
"Comme rna premiere experience etait celle ou le spectacle du 
monde etait non point abolu, mais abandonne au profit d'un acte 
toutinterieur prenant conscience de sa pure disponibilite, et de 
son pur exercice, la seconde experience etait celle du temps ou 
rna vie s'ecoulait et qui &tait, non point nie, mais enracine dans 
un present coextenslf a l'Etre et ou ce temps lui-meme fondait sa 
propre realite •••• 
"Une troisieme experience, qui devrait donner touts leur 
portee aux deux pr~c~dentes, c'etait oette experience que Platon 
a faite sans doute de tres bonne heure, a savoir, que le monde 
dans lequel nous vivons n'est pas le monde des choses que nous 
voyons, mais le monde des pensees que nous avons. Chacun vit et 
~~--------------~ 
L 
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The primitive experience of being for Lavelle, then, is not 
merely the experience of the inscription of myself in being, but 
also that of participation in being. It puts us in touch with an 
absolute being which, however, is not outside of us at some inac-
cessible distance since the exercise of our activity can not 
exceed the presence of being. tmus Lavelle sees an identity 
between the discovery of Being and that of our own proper being. 10 
Notions gf Being, !£1, ~ Unlvocity 
Lavelle, who is Kierkegaardian in many respects, maintains 
that being is discovered by the human mind in the experiential 
actualization of the mind's coming to know reality, in the "act 
accomplishing itself." He maintains the unity and univocity of 
being, and founds his whole philosophy on an ontological argument 
which identifies being and the idea of it in God. The affirmation 
• 
of being is the primary evidence, the starting point of all 
philosophy. To exclude nothingness and to affirm the universality 
meurt dans le monde de ses pensees plutot que dans le monde des 
choses." (Translation mine.) Other pertinent ref~rences to 
Lavelle's writings are: ~#llatre, pp. 9, 23, 294; ~ l'acte, 
(Paris, 1934), p. 49; La presence totale, p. 212. See also Dom. 
Raymond Loza, O.S.B., WL'experience primitive de L. Lavelle," 
Revue Thomiste, LVI (1956), 271-280. 
lOLavelle, De l'etre,p. 308. See also Jean Ecole, "L'exper-
ience .de l'etre et le point de depart de la metaphysique selon 
Louis Lavelle," Les Studes Philosophigues, VIII (1953), 372-383. 
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of being are at bottom one and the same. ll 
"(There is] a threefold aspect within the initial presence 
of being whose evidence is act. There is first the Eresence of 
Reing, and we are aware of it before adverting to ourselves •••• 
Second, there is the discovery of ~ Eresence to being which was 
implied but not actually distinguished in the first awareness •• 
• • Lastly, there is the awareness of ~ interiority ~ being, 
a recognition that we participate in the presence of being.,,12 
The world is no longer an object to be known, but it is a creation 
to which we are associated. In keeping with this line of thought. 
man finds himself closer to his fellow men. "To scorn, to ignore 
anyone," Lavelle has said, "is to wish to hurl him into nothing-
ness."13 It might also be noted that, since the idea of being is 
itself a being, the only concept that is adequate to it is the 
concept of being. As Lavelle puts it,"it is impossible ~o pose 
the idea of being without perceiving at once that the being of 
the idea is the same as the being of which it is the idea.,,14 
IlJean Lacroix, "Un philosophe du consentement," Lumiere et 
Vie, VII (1952), 105-121. Translated by Dom. Illtyd Trethowan;-
1IJlPhI1osopher of Acceptance: Louis Lavelle," Downside Review, 
LXXI (1953), 372-386. See pp. 374-375 especially. 
12Smith, p. 348. Italics mIne. 
l3Quoted by Jean Baruzi in his "Louis Lavelle." Les Ittudes 
Philosophigues, VI (Avril-Septembre 1951),139. (TranS:lation 
mIne. ) 
14Cited in Smith, p. 348. 
rr~--------~ 
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Whatever our verdict on his notion of !£! rather than ~ 
as the metaphysical point of departure, Lavelle claims several 
oonsiderable consequences for his doctrine. First, it enables 
him to bridge experience and philosophy. Secondly, it reaffirms 
the principle that being is intrinsically intelligible. Thirdly, 
act is its own sufficient reason. And fourthly, act is eternally 
efficacious. Lavelle emphasizes interiority and thus makes each 
individual valuable and truly operative as a second cause. lS 
'Phe notion of univocity of being in Lavelle's philosophy can 
best be described in his own words: "\Yhen I used ••• [the 
notion of univocity] for the first time, it was in no way to 
contradict analogy; but it was to combat phenomenalism and to show 
that it is impossible to avoid the unity of being and to adhere to 
[notions of) a multiple phenomenal existenoe. My position is the 
following: all beings oan differ, indeed, in so far as tqey are 
individual beings. Their proper being resides, however, in their 
very dependenoe with regard to the absolute being who alone is 
capable of sustaining them in the totality of being.,,16 
15~., pp. 347-349. 
16Letter of Louis Lavelle to N. J. J. Balthasar dated Decem-
ber 17, 1950. Cited by Balthasar in his IfL'univocite non immanent 
de l'etre total," Giornale di Metafisica, VII (4) (Luglio-Agosto 
1952), 433: "Lorsque je l'ar employ'e [la notion de l'univooite] 
pour la premiere fois, ce n'etait nullement pour contredire l'anal 
ogie: mals pour combattre le phenomenisme et montrer qu'il est 
impossible d'eviter Itunite de l'etre et de sten tenir a la multl-
plicite des formes des existonce phenomenale. Ma position est la 
suivant: c'est que tous les etres peuvent bien differer en tant 
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Lavelle's great contribution to contemporary metaphysics is 
his reaffirmation of the ubiquitous, transcendental character of 
being as the primary object of human wisdom. By identifying act 
(actus) and being, he attempts a union of metaphysics and exper-
ience. "Credit must go to him likewise for restoring the analogy 
of being as a problem in philosophy and for defending the dignity 
of man in a climate that sometimes dignifies only dollars.,,17He 
does not begin with a preconceived method in philosophy; and, 
synthetic as he is, he is ever willing to search through the past 
and the present to assimilate truth wherever he comes upon it. 
But there are grave problems in Lavelle too. Is description 
adequate as a philosophical method? "Can a philosophy oarry 
oertitude at its heart when its feet are resting on a non-knowl-
edge type of awareness?,,18 But to do more than mention these 
difficulties would carry us away from pur goal in this thesis • 
• 
Participation 
The identity of being and act is the central and most orig-
qu1etres individuels. Leur etre propre reside pourtant dans une 
meme dependance a l'egard de l'etre absolue qui seul est capable 
de les soutenir dans la totalite d'etre. ft (Translation mine.) 
l7Smith, pp. 368-369. 
l8~. A good summary and criticism of Lavelle's system 
can be found in Jean Ecole's La metaphysigue de l'etre dans la 
philo8ophie de Louis Lavelle TPhilosophes Contemporainsr;-Editions 
Nauwelaerts,Parls, 1957, in Chapitre XII: tlReflexions critiques 
et complementaires," 231-257. 
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inal feature of Lavelle's thought--it is the key to his whole 
metaphysics of participation. Being unfolds itself as one and 
univocal, but it is at the same time infinite and above all, pure 
act! God. For Lavelle, all that exists, exists by a participa-
tion of this pure, infinite act. By means of tilis participation 
Lavelle intends to surmount pantheism and to affirm the transcend-
ence of God. Lavellian participation is neither inductive nor 
deductive, but an initial and constant fact of experience.19 
Human struggle and endeavor, then, may be considered as motivated 
by the desire to render our ontic condition less potential and 
impertect. Our pass<.,Ge from thing to person and from state to 
act testifies to our finitude and desire for the infinite. 20 
Since the activity of the ego participates in the absolute activ-
ity, and that by the intermediation of the world and human nature, 
different possibilities of action forman are but differe~t ways 
of realizing this participation. rfile experience of participation, 
then, the initial fact from which all Lavellian philosophy takes 
its flight, "seizes on vital consciousness as a personal act. In 
this way the act of consciousness perceives and recognizes its 
active participation in Pure Act, who is Himself a Person, and 
19Bechara Sargi, La participation a l'etre dans la philos-
oEhie ~ Louis Lavelle-rParis, 1951), pp. 83-88 especIilly. 
20James Collins, "Louis Lavelle on Human Participation,!! The 
Philosophical ReView, LVI (1947), 168. 
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who offers Himself to be participated in by consciousness. This 
consciousness, then, is an act participating in the Absolute it-
self. Here is all its reality, all the reality of the ego which 
in no way differs from consciousness.,,21 
Lavelle views man as a limited participation of the Infinite, 
as indeed, every creature necessarily is. But the creature still 
bears a resemblance to the divinity. Lavelle wrote: flIt is a 
fact that God cannot create things (which are only appearances) 
but only beings, and that he cannot create them without making 
them participate in his essence, that is to, say, giving them the 
power ef self-creativity just as he eternally creates himself.,,22 
The words ef Professor Cellins en Lavelle serve as an apt cenclu-
sien to this section on participatien. "Lavelle has always kept 
clearly before him the twofold aim of his philosO,phy: it must 
maintain a certain unity in being incQrder to, allew for creaturely 
• 
participatiO,n and for knO,wledF~e o'f the' Transcendent, and it must 
likewise maintain the distinctien between beings which have per-
sonal autonomy •• • • The vocation of the creature is to bring 
21Sargi, p. 11. (Translation mine.) 
22LO,uis ~avelle, "NO,tes sur Ie sujet: peurquO,i y a-t-il un 
mende?," Giornale di Metafisica, X (3) (MagfjiO,-Giugno 1955), 384: 
"C'est une 4vIdeftcrqUe Viea 11& peut pas creer des cheses (qui ne 
sont que des apparences) m~a,.slftl~t des etres et qulil ne peut 
les creer qu'en los rai~~~~t~&i~e~~son ess~nce, crest-a-dire 
en leur do~an~ a eux-m~_"""la RiuJ~sanca"..:3i\ se creer comme il se 
cree lui-meme eternelletnent.~,(~~1:is~ed PJsthumO,USlY; translatiO,n 
mine.) ~<~~:~~ 
forth its own being by sharing in the power of God, for the 
creatlwe is no mere limitation of God."23 
Platonism in Lavelle 
"One is a philosopher in so far as he Is a follower of Plato" 
(Qg philosophe [!!£] selon gu'on Elatonise.) Such are Lavelle's 
very words. 24 The myth of the cave is for Lavelle the introduc-
tion to philosophy. There is a sensible world and an intelligible 
world, a world of appearances and a world of hidden realities, 
which are the only authentic ones. And one of these worlds hides 
the other from us, but not to the extent of making us unable to 
discern it or of preventing us from reaching it. We must come out 
of the cave, from the world of shadows, and discover little by 
little the world of true ideas. 2$ But this myth can be misunder-
stood and the wrong aspects of Platoni~m attributed to Lavelle • 
• F10r him reali ty is not behind but wi thin appearances; and being 
is not behind but ~ experiences. Lavelle himself has noted what 
he considers the shortcomings of the full Platonic doctrine. He 
writes: "But it seems to us that Plato gave way to an idolatrous 
penchant when he considered that he consolidated our thoughts by 
23Collins, p. 177. 
24Cited by Gonzague Truc, De J.-P. Sartre a L. Lavelle; ou 
desagregation ~ reintegration (Paris, 1946), p: n~4. (Transla. 
tion mine.) 
2$For fuller discussion of Platonism and Lavelle see Truc, 
pp. 133-158; Lacroix, p. 374; and Lavelle, "Temofhage,1I p. 128. ,.. 
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making ideas of them, that is to say, objects accessible only to 
pure intelligence, and that it was to ienore the true function of 
things to reduce them to being only illusory and useless copies of 
ideas when they were for us, on the contrary, the double way by 
which each spirit became capable of utilizing his own possibili. 
ties, that is to say, of actualizing them, and of commWlicatlng 
with other spirits in a universe which was the same for all.,,26 
Elsewhere, however, speaking of striot existentialism, he com-
plained that it was an anti-Platonism, observing that Platonism 
always comes to lifo again after it has been neglected. frhis is 
neoessarily so, he said, since, al thou,":h Platonism ceaselessly 
denies the world we have under our eyes whero our existence 
unfolds itself, this denial is the only way of access to the life 
of the spirit, the life that is truly ours.27 
Existentialism's strong emphasi~on the existence of ,things 
has already been pointed out. Platonism and Lavelle prefer to 
26Lavelle, "Temoi9iage," p. 130: "Mais il nous semblait que 
, ~ ~ Platon cedait a une sorte de penchant idolatre, quand il oroyait 
oonsolidaire nos pensees en en faisan~ des idees, c'est-a-dire des 
objets encore, accessibles seulement a l'intelligence pure, et que 
o'etait meconna!tre la fonction veritable des choses de les 
reduire a n'etre que des copies illusoires et inutiles des idees, 
la o~ elles etaient pour nous au contraire le double moyen par 
lequel chague esprit devenait capable de mettre en jeu ses propres 
possibllites, c'est-a-dire de les actualise, et de oommuniquer 
avec les autres esprits dans un univers qui etait le meMe pour 
tous • " ( Transla ti on mine.) 
27Louis Lavelle, "Preface fl to M. }4'. Sciacca's Ltexistence ~ 
~ (Paris, 1951), p. 8. 
stress the priority of essence. They conceive the essence as 
pre-existing, and the being exists only in so far as it partlc-
ipates in the essence. Of course, God is the being whose essence 
implies existonce and whose boundless existence constitutes the 
center of all essences. But in human essences there is an ideal 
type which embraces all that can be realized of what is properly 
human, and it is towards this that \.;e must look in order to find 
the qualities and features that we should eive to our existence. 
For Lavelle, as for all Platonists, what counts is not to exist 
but to choose the essence that is best. Of itself existence is 
valueless. "We may say that essence is not merely the possibility 
of existence, or its content, but that it gives value to exist-
ence.,,28 
In La conscience ~ soi Lavelle most clearly expounds his 
re-statement of Platonism, or perhap~ more accurately, of 
Augustianism. "The real world,1t he sa~s, "i9 the world of ideas 
and not the world of things. From the moment we penetrate into 
it we find ourselvos enlightened; our own nature, our destiny, 
the conduct we must follow, our relations with other beings, 
appear to us in a moving lieht that we delight to contemplate, 
and that magnetizes our will. • • • We do not in any sense create 
ideas. 'rhey are the elements of a material universe. rrhey re-
28Louis Lavelle, De l'acte (Paris, 1937), p. 104. (Trans-
lation mine.) 
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veal themselves to us by an act of intelligence as things reveal 
themselves to us by an a.ct of attention." 29 :F'rom this view we 
can see how Lavelle I s philos ophy does constitute a synthesis o.f 
essentialIsm, existentialism, and the philosophy of splrit. This 
also expla.ins reference to his philosophy as an "essentialtst 
existentialism" or a "spiritual exlstenti3.lismtf. 
But Lavelle did not feel that Platonism alone was adequate. 
He felt, rather, that Platonism risks sacrificing the person to 
the idea if it does not incorporate into itself the influence of 
the Christian tradition. 30 Lavelle's desire was to maintain and 
reanimate a philosophy Which could be considered as of Platonic 
and Cartesian inspiration but in which the share of Christianity 
was capital. Lavelle recognized that this undertaking was open 
to widely differing forms of thought, but he desired that within 
his system there should reign an agreement on t!1e primacy of the 
life of the spirit and on the impossibility of leaving the direc-
29Louis Lavelle, ~ conscience de !2i (Paris, 1933), pp. 60-
61: "Le vrai monde, c'est Ie monde des idees et non pas Ie monde 
des choses. Des que nous y penetrons, nous nous sentons eclaires; 
notre propre nature, notre destinee, la conduite que noua devons 
tenir, nos relations avec les autres etres, nous apparaissent dans 
une lumiere mobile qui rejouit notre regard et aimante notre 
volunte •••• Nous ne creona point les idees. Elles sont les 
elements d'un univers de matiere. Elles se revelent a nous par un 
acte de l'intelligence comme les choses se revelent a nous par un 
acta du regard." (Translation mine.) 
30Louis Lavelle Letter of ~ay 20, 1946 to M. F. Sciacca. 
Cited by Sciacca in fl Dal mio carteggio con Louis Lavelle," Q.!.Q.r.-
~ di Metafisica, VIr (4) (Luglio-Agos to 1952), 489. 
tiOll of human conduct to science and different techniques. 3l 
Pantheism !!! Lavelle 
From what has been said thus far it is not difficult to 
unders tand how the charGe of pan t.l}6 i sn could be brought agalns t 
these ideas. Many of Lavelle's statements would seem to admit of 
only this interpretation, as for example: ItGvd is the true 
essence of all beings, and, as is often said, more interior to me 
than I am to myself. tI (Dleu est lfessence veritable de tous les 
------- ---
etres, II connne .2!! l!. ill souvent, plus interieur a !!.!.21 gue moi-
meme.}32 But in reality Lavelle did not intend a pantheism, and 
considers that he has escaped this reproach by his oonception, 
unitary and double at the same time, of freedOIll and participation. 
The purpose of tl things It (tile given) in Lavelle IS philos ophy is to 
send us continually back to '1beingslt ,(oonscious possession of the 
• given in the act which is being.) In s: sense nature is that 
which sends me back unoeasingly to myself. It is in returning to 
myself that I disoover the origin and source of being. In dis-
cov~ring oursol ves in this way, in. our profoundes t depth, vIe dis-
cover also the nature of the Being by whom alone we oxist. And 
what the intuition reveals to us is that heing in act.33 
3I Ibid., p. 487. (Letter dated April 22, 1946.) 
32La velIe, !2!. 1 r acte, p. 105. (Translation mine.) 
33See Laoroix, p. 377. 
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Perhaps the strongest proof advanced by Lavelle against 
pantheism is his idea that we do not share in being as parts in 
a totalized whole, but rather as personal agents united with a 
God who is the ?ersonal source of our reality. rhe incommunica-
bility proper to a person prevents either an identification of 
absolute and participated being, or a designation of God as the 
point of convergence of an infinite number of finite persons. 34 
More than once l.lavelle had to handle this objection to his system. 
Here, in his own words, is the answer he gave to his friend, In. F. 
Sciacca: 
I a~ grateful to you for having been kind enough to 
point out the fears to which my position on God and 
freedom have given rise. You fear too that a suspicion 
of pantheism or Spinozism may be ~enerated in the minds 
of some readers. This is not the first time that I have 
heard such a reserve expressed, but I always defend my-
self against it. I believe that it is precisely there 
that the remedy is found for all possIble pantheism •• 
For if God is a being who is suf~fcient to himself or 
who gives being to himself, creation for him consists 
alwa.ys in the communication that he makes of his being, 
in a gift of himself which he renews infinitely. But 
this gift which he makes of himself would be illusory 
if there were no possibility for each created being 
of giving himself by an act which renders him the 
cause of himself, that is to say, by a free act. 
Also, it is our subordina.tion to God that frees us 
instead of enslaving us. This explains both why God 
created consciences--and the world as the possibility 
of their existence-and why we are always able to turn 
against God the very freedom which comes from him and 
34Col11ns, p, 176. 
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which can be exercised fully only in union with hi~ • .15 
In summary, then, we n:.ay say that Lavelle's philosophy 
begins with a reflexive analysis of the one evident reality, our 
consc iousness of our being. In thi s experience, whlc:l. is an Be t, 
we can develop our essence thr(mgh choices born of our free will. 
Being is precisely this act through which we participate in the 
very being of God, and our life should properly develop by an 
ever-growing participation through our freedom in the pure act, 
who is God. Freedom, of course, implies an importance in the 
being who exercises it. These two factors will be discussed in 
35Louls Lavelle, Letter of May 20, 19t~6 to M. F. Sc laces.. 
Cited by Sciacca in "Dal mio cartegglo con Louis Lavelle," Gior-
~ di Jtietafisica, VII (4) (Luglio:':'Agosto 1952), 489: -
Je vous remercie aussi de voulo!r bien de me dire 1es 
craintes que vous a suggeree la ,relation que j'etablis 
entre Dieu et la libertJ' at Ie S:OUP90n de pantheisme • 
ou de spinozisme qu'elle peut faire nattre dans lfesprit 
de quelques lectures. Ce n'est pas la premiere fois 
que j t entands formular une telle reserva. j'l[ais je me 
defends touJours contre elle. Je cr~is precisement 
que c'est la que se trouve Ie remade contre tout pan-
theisme possible. Car si Dieu est un etre qui se 
suffit ou qui se donne l'etre a lui-r:tome, lu creation 
pour lui consista toujours dans la communication qu'il 
fait de son ~tre, dans un don de 30i qui se renouvelle 
infiniment: mais ce don qu'il fait de lul ... meme sarait 
illusoire, si ce n"tait pas la possibilit~ pour chaque 
At " d d 'At' A e re cree e se onner 1 e re a lui-meme par un acte 
qui rend cause de soi, c'est-a-dire par un acte libre. 
Ains! c'est notre subordination a Dieu qui nous libere, 
au lie".l de nous asservir. Ce qui expl:'Lque a la fois 
pourquoi Dieu cree des consciences--et Ie monde comme 
p08sibilite de leur existence,-et pourquoi IlOUS pOU-
vons toujours retournar contre Dieu cette liberte meme 
qui vient de lui et que ne s'exerce pleinement que dans 
son union avec lui. (Translation mine.) 
the following chapter where Lavelle's concepts of person and 
personality will be elaborated. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
LAVELLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF PERSON AND PERSONALI'rY: 
THE PRIMACY OF FREEDOM 
In giving a philosophical explanation of the human person, 
St. Thomas and the other medieval theologians placed emphasis on 
the human substance. l But this emphasis was destined to change.~ 
Several centuries later Descartes placed his emphasis on the 
self-consciousness of the spiritual substance, the whole essence 
of which was "to think," and this set the tone of all subsequent 
inquiries. John Locke, for instance, in his Essay Concerninr; 
Hu..man Understanding describes the person as a "thinking, intel-
ligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider 
itself as itself.") In a very true sense we may say that all 
modern philosophy tends to look on conaciousness or self-con-
lpertinent references to st. Thomas' writings on "person" 
are: SeT., I, 29, 1; 85, 7; ~., II, 75 and 8); ~. ~ An., ). 
~.!~., 25, 1; ~M., 9,2. 
2ft'lor a brief his tory of concepts of "person" see }<"'. Coples-
ton, S.J., "The Human person in Contemporary Philosophr," Chapter 
VIII of Contemporary PhilOSOph, (London, 1956), 103-124; espe-
cially PP. 103-1°4.- See also ames H. VanderVeldt, O.F.M., and 
Robert P. Odenwald, Psychiatry and Catholicism (New York, 1952), 
Chapter 1: "Person and Personality," pp. 1 .. 14. 
r. 3John Locke, !!! Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II 
~hap. XXVII, sec. 9. 
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sciousness as the chief characteristic of person and personality. 
This can be seen clearly in Hegel, for whom the progress of Mind 
or Spirit consists largely in the advance of self-consciousness. 
"Consciousness" 1s presence to self in being through varying 
experiences. This is the point that Professor Knudson makes when 
he writes: "From the metaphysical point of view the most impor-
tant thing conneoted with personality is the faot that in it unity 
and identity are co-existent with plurality and Change. u4 
Two ourrent philosophical movements in which Lavelle has been 
found to participate are especially concerned with person and 
personality. They are existentialism and personalism. In this 
chapter brief consideration will be given to the notion of person 
in each of these schools of thought, taking Marcel as a represen-
tative of the first and Mounier as representing the second. The 
relation and application of these ideas,to Louis Lavellets.philos-
ophy w111 then be shown in detail, with special attention given 
to the important concept of freedom. 
Existentialists stress the difference between a human person 
and the things of nature which man uses. For an existentialist 
there is a sharp difference between the Umwelt, the world of 
things or objects, and the Mitwelt, or world of persons. In h1s 
existentialist philosophy, for instanoe, Gabriel Marcel shows how 
4Albert C. Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism (Boston, 
1949), p, 83. 
44 
one becomel a ·peraon· by transcendIng one's aelf-enelosednesa 
through love tor other persons and tree acceptance of a perianal, 
spirl tual relatloDBhip wIth God.. He laya emphaaia on the indIv-
idual, conerete subject, which i8 neither 1dent1cal w1th the 
empir1cal ego nor a moment In the subjeotiv1tr of a Kantlan tltans-
oend~tal ego. The ego (le mel) or aelf-enolosed oonao10usnea. 
in which man is a member ot the anonymous "onen (!!sm.) is dlstin-
gut.hed trom the pera<m. For Marcel the peNon ls oharacter1zed 
b)" a commitment. I atfirm m)"selt as a person in the measure that 
I assume responsib1l1ty folt what I do and sa7 1n work, aetion, or 
the whole course of lite." Because ot its v8r1 nature. personal ... 
it,' cannot be exhausted in an,- one partioular 'ooJllDitment sinoe it 
participate. in Being, whiah la 1 ta beginning and ita end.6 
The pel'lonalieta, on the other hand, regard man as capable 
ot beoca!ng a "person,· but a. tbre ... ned at the same time 'bJ' a 
• 
" 
tendenc)" to .urz-ender either to egocentrio individualia. or to 
sub.erslon in the to tali t7 • !he1 dl. tingu1ah .harp11 between the 
indlvidual and the person. "Individual" 1. used in a pejoratlve 
eenae to denote man con.idered aa a center or epring ot egolstl0 
des1re. "Personn Is conceived b,. the peraonall.ts in close 
cormectlon with the idea of a moral vocatlon. "Individual" and 
·perlon" are not separate, but two alpects ot one human rea11t7. 
50&br1e1 Marcel. !2!2 Viator (Parls, 1944), p. 26. 
6Ibid ., PP. 32-33. 
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It 18 but a question ot uniting them hierarchically. Emmanuel 
Mounier, the ohlef modem French personalist, has given careful 
though t to his def1ni tion of person: "A person i. a spiri tual 
being," he says, "const~tuted as such by a manner of subsistence 
and .ot 1ndependence in belns} 1t maintains this subslsience by 
its adherence to a. hierarchy or value. freely adopted, a8sl~latedi 
andllved, by a responsible selt-commltment and by a constant 
converslon. I, thus unltlesall Its actlvlt,rln freedom and 
develops 1 ta ownunlque voea tlon, moreover, by means of creatlve 
aots.,,7 
Whlle the person ls a soclal belng, he Is, nevertheless, 
more than a mere member ot a group. Rather he Is orientated 
towarda a 80ciety ot persons .ho are tree, morally responslble 
hUJllall beings. Aa Mounier 1t'l'i tes: "The person Is not t something' 
tha t on. can tind a t the end ot an analysis, nor 18 1 t a 4.tlnable 
comblnatlon ot charaoteristios. It l1;:' •• re a sua-total, the Ite!18 
CQuld be lilted: but thls Is the reaUty who .. e content. oannot 
~ Rut !nto!!!. 1nv!ptoa (Gabriel :Marcel). It they could it would 
b. determlned by th_J but the person Is self-determlning and. tree 
1Bmmanuel Mounier, Manlt.fte a~ servlce ~ p!ESonnallam. 
(Parll, 1936), p. 63: dune personne eat un Itre splrltuel conatl-
tu' camme tel par un man1&re du sUbsiatance et d'lndependance dans 
Ion ItreJ e11e entretlent cette subslstence par son adh'.lon a une 
hierarchl. d. valeurs 11bremen t adopt'es, asslmil'es, .t vacuea 
par un engagement respona.bla .t un constanta converslon; elle 
unit1. a1ne1 toute SOD activit' dans 1& libert. at devaloppe par 
surcrolt, a coups dtact •• createura, 1& alngular1t' de sa voca-
tlon." (Transla tlon mine.) 
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It is a presence rather than a being, a presence that is active, 
without limits. u8 And again Mounier writes: "In its inner exper-
ience the person is a presence directed towards the world and 
other persons, mingled with them in universal space. Other 
persons do not limit it, they enable it to be and to grow. The 
person only exists thus towards others, it only knows itself in 
knowing others, only finds itself in being known by them •••• 
Just as a philosopher who from the start confines himself to 
thinking never finds the doorway to being, so the man who begins 
by shutting himself in himself never finds his way towards others • 
• • • One might almost say that I have no existence save in so 
far as r exist for others, and that to be is, in the final 
analysis, to 10ve.,,9 
From these sketches we can see that there are definite 
differences between personalism and existentialism. Persqnalism 
emphasizes the person's orientation towards society and other 
persons; existentialists have a tendency to belittle objective, 
social institutions. Perhaps one reason for this, as Mounier has 
suggested, is that existentialism tends to describe authentic 
existence in negative terms, whioh involves tearing oneself away 
from the mentality of the crowd. Personalists view the person 
8Ennnanuel Mounier, Personalism (l~ew York, 1952), trans. 
Philip Mairet, p. 35. 
9 ~., p. 19. 
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and society of persons as a positive standard. The theme of self-
creating is common to both; for personalists it constitutes 
personality; for existentialists it is the achievement of freedom 
and the fulfillment of one's nature. lO 
Before concluding this section on modern theories of the 
person, let us briefly consider the philosophy of a modern 
Christian personalist from among Thomistic philosophers. Jacques 
Maritain accepts the notion of matter as the principle of individ-
uation, and describes individuality as "that which excludes from 
myself all other men," and as "the narrowness of the ego, forever· 
threatened and forever eager to grasp tor i tselt. ,tll 
Like many modern philosophers, Maritain places his emphasis 
on freedom as the chief characteristic of the human person. Thus 
he holds that one can become a person, ceas~ to be a person, or 
descend into being a mere "individual," a mere "self." In. The 
Degrees of Knowledge Maritain writes that Ita person is a centre of 
freedom Which confronts things, the universe, God, talks with 
another person, communicates with them by intelligence and affec-
tion. tt 12 Personality, for him, is the subs is tence of the spiri-
10F\rederick Copleston, S. J., Contemporary Philosophy (London, 
1956), p. 108. 
IlJacques Maritain, ~ Person .!!!£ ~ Common Good (New York, 
1947), p. 27. 
l2Jacques Mari tain, The Degrees 2f. Knowledge (Hew York, 1938). 
trans. Bernard Wall, p. 2847 
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tual soul oommun10ated to the composite. It consists in individ-
uality (not individuation, which is a bodily characteristic), 
unity and inteerity, subsistence, intelligence, will, liberty, and 
the possession of the self by the self. l ) Thus Maritain views 
personality as a substantial, metaphysical perfection which opens 
out in the order of operation to psychological and moral values. 
"Man has to work for his persona.lity, just as he must work for 
his liberty; and for that he mus t pay a very high pri.c e • Indeed, 
in the field of action, a man will be a persona.lity (the maker of 
his own self) only when his reason, by means of organized virtue 
and inspired by love (no less than God's Spirit) gathers up his 
soul into his hands--anima ~ 1B manibus meis semper--and into 
the hands of God. For thus he gives to that torrent of oonfliot .. 
ing forces within him, the beautiful unity of a moral profile, 
which is but the seal of his radical :ontological unity. "ll~., 
In this first part of this chapter we havo tried to describe 
the climate of modern philosophies of person. Personalism holds 
that the true person is manifested only when one is "outer-direc-
ted" to the world of persons and things other than himself. Exls 
entialism, on the other hand, in the doctrine of Gabriel Maroel, 
is ohiefly concerp-ed with the concrete, individual, experienoing 
subjeot, who must affirm or con~it himself to the reality he 
l)~., p. 287. 
14~., p. 28$. 
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experiences. In the following section it will be shown how Louis 
Lavelle's ideas of person and personality are a combination of the 
personalist and existentialist notions of person and the Platonic 
idea of participation-thus forming a metaphysical doctrine which 
synthesizes the various modern philosophical notions of person and 
personality. 
Person and Personality !n Louis Lavelle 
As has been shown, the "I" or tlegol! for Lavelle is a partic-
ipated being, tllat is, something first found within being which 
freely gives itself its interior being by an act which is an 
acceptance. "Man is a being caught up (engage) in matter which 
indi vidualizes and separa.tes him, and . ~e is called upon to sur-
mount that barrier in order to rise to the purity of the spirit 
that is One. By acts of the will he posits himself as a spirit 
in his own proper and individual bein&, thus participating in the 
creative activity of the Pure Act. Thanks to intelligence, he 
transcends the limitations of his individuality and is able to 
conceive the universal, which thus opens itself to a participation 
that can thereafter be realized by his will.,,15 For Lavelle, man 
is not only man; he is a spirit who lives, acts, and grows accord-
ing to his participation in the Spirit, God. A problem which hol~ 
a prominent plaoe in Lavelle's thought is that of knowing how 
l5Paul Foulquie, Existentialism (London, 1948), p. 114. 
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conscious beings can have a friendship with one another. In La 
-
pre.enc·. totale Lavell e ·wri tea: "Behind all. the partioular 
questions that we can pose for oUl"selves, the problem oi' being 
and the ego is the only one whioh interests us prOi'oundly.n16 And 
again: "Communioation between eons clous beings Is possible, 
doubtless, only belond the one and the other and In a deep and 
serious interior! ty' which ia common to both, to whioh each pene-
trates by the medIation ot the other."17 The ego, tor Lavelle, is 
not something that tollows upon c.onsoiouanes.. It is in one and 
the .ame act that the ego and consciousness are g1 ven. 
Apart trom the body in whioh it Is existing, the ego, or selt, 
is nothing. It I, an empty" torm which only the non-self can 
nalrlsh or complete. We must make a distinot10n, theretore, 
be tween our sel ves and the world, and cons fJCl uentl,. we mus t have a 
lim1ted body.18 By my body I became an exiatent object tor 
another, and an individual aenter ot senaationa and representatiD1'l8 
tor myselt. "Further, it 1. rIght that we should love even our 
bodle., Inasmuch as th ey are a par t of our pers on and are the a on ... 
dltlon ot our spIritual llte. n19 The theory ot!2!.!. oorps (lIQ' body) 
16Louis Lavelle, ~ prAsanae total~ (Par1s, 1934), p. 3). 
(Tra.nslation mine.) 
17De l'ytre (Par!., 1947), Introduotion, p. 3). (Trana-
lation idne. 
l~ l'acte (ParIs, 1931), pp. 401-402. 
199uatre Saints (Par!a, 19$1), p. 209. 
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holds as important a pl.ace in Lavelle's thought as in that of 
Gabriel Marcel. This body is both mine and an object in the world 
which bears witness to my participated being and to my placement 
in the world. 20 Matter servos as the support for action and the 
basis of objective communication between persons. But material 
life is only a means whereby we acquire the life o.f the spirit 
and determine our complete essence. As a co-principle in human 
nature, the body helps to keep an individual spirit unique. 
Because we have bodies, we are bound by sensation and time. 
Sens9.tion gives contact \'Vith the present; time is an instrurnent 
of onr personal development placed at our d:t3~Josal to convert 
floating states of consciousness into integrated personal actual-
ity, and thus we construct our subjective life. 21 
flaving noted the importance of matter, or a body which is a 
necessary element for us as participated beings, we must give 
". 
special attention now to the freedom we possess and its importance 
in Lavelle's understanding of the human person. Our experience 
makes us aware not only of our corporal existence but also of our 
freedom or liberty. By means of our liberty we realize oUJ"selves 
through choices which determine and shape our being. Ours is a 
20For spec;fic passages on the importance of the body in 
Lavelle, see Presence, pp. 78, 154-155; ~, pp. 402-403. 
21See .Tames Collins, IlLouis Lavelle on Human Participation" 
The Philosophical ReView, LVI (1947), 156-lA3; especially pp. 168-
169. 
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liberty which supposes matter. "Each of us has a situation in 
the universe wiuch is proper to him, it is submitted to a certain 
number of conditions v{ilich in no way depend on him, which he has 
not chosen, but without which he would not exist as a particular 
being. n22 
'Nith the introduction of this notion of freedo'TI we touch upon 
the central point in Lavelle's doctrirle of person and personality. 
Indeed, he calls freedor.!. the "heart of myself. 1123 Freedom is also 
the central factor in tho problem of pa.rticip~ltion. Without it, 
participation would be inexplicable. liThe end of freedom is the 
perfection of the subject who exercises it. It is the relation-
ship between different possibilities [of the person's activities] 
and their individual realization which constitutes the permanent 
dialogue of participation. Self-creation by participati ')n is the 
autonomous realization of certain poEisibilities possessed .at the 
base of our free choice." 24 In Lavelle's own words, freedom or 
liberty is our "participation itself inasmuch as it is a partici-
pation in an act which is a cause of itself.,,25 
Lavelle looks upon freedOM as the power of creative initia-
22Louis Lavelle, ~ puissances £B. .!12.Ql (Paris, 19Lt-8), p. 167. 
23Acte, p. 189. 
24Bechara Sarr,i, La particlps. ti'm a l' etre dans 1 a philos-
ophie de Louis Lave11e\Paris, 1957), p. 92. 
25Lavelle, ~, p. 198. 
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tlve trlrough the use of whic;l 'fle ma~:::e o'...lrsalves participate more 
and more in the All, or totality of being. ?'urtflor, this freedom 
is something receIved, and is orientated to society with others. 
La.velle arg;ues that the exlstenco of n moral order de~1ands the 
existence of a plurality of free beings. ttl have need of other 
fr-eedo!llB because my freedom can only taln;. another freedo~l 8.S l'ta 
object. We are well aV/are that it truly exercises itself only in 
the presence of a r!'ee being and not in the presonce :.Jf a. thing. 
It 1s the encountor wi th a freodom whioh is notL'1ine t:lat obliges 
!frJ freedom to quostlorl itself,to become deoper, and evon to 
actualize 1 tself .1'26 
L"l Lavello I t'J pJ:lilosophy, the orea. tion of' t~w so1:t Is 01"1"60-
ted only through the act of' participation. In fact it would not 
be an exaggeration to 1iH1Y that Ltivtlllo to. wh(llo ph.ilosophy i.:; a 
description of t:lia oraat1on af t:10 :1O'lf by tho solf. 27 P~ut 
although Lavelle asserts that we croate ourllolvea, he in no way 
intends to attribute to u:s a freedom so cOr:lplete that \10 are solf-
28 
sufficient ill orea ting oUl"sel ves.. Our ego resides essentially 
26Ibid •• p. 18S: tlJtai besoin des autres libertes parce que 
ma lib.rte ne peut prendre qutune autre liberte pour objet. Noua 
sentona bien qu'elle ne s'exerce vraiment quten presence d.'un atre 
libra at non point en presence dtune ollose. Crest la rencontre 
d'une liberte ~ul ntest pas Is. mlenne qui oblige la mienne a 
s'interroger, a s'o,ppro:fondir, et r:13me .. stactuallser.tl (Trans-
lation ro!.ne.) 
27Jean Eoole, 1!!. metaph,slgue de l'3tre 2.!ll! 1!. phl1osophle 
~ Louis Lav01le (Parls, 195,), p. Y>3. 
28 
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in the aot by whioh it exists--a partioipating aot. Our liberty, 
then, is the disposition or use of the existenoe whioh we possess 
and the ways which are offered. to us to use it. 29 
But if it is the same thlnr, to oreate oneself and to parti-
cipate, and if, on the other hand, the possible is that which our 
liberty oan do with our nature, then to participate or create 
oneself seems to be essentially the discovery and aoceptance of 
the powers of our na. ture in order to rend er them our own. 'rhe ac t 
of aoceptanoe, Lavelle sa.ys, is nothing more than oonsciousness 
of our partioipation in the great All. 30 But the Lavellian philos 
ophy aspires less to elaborate a theory of participation than to 
give a total solution to the existence of the participant. In 
fact, at every moment experience reveals the individual, personal 
participant to us. 31 Our liberty is given to us in order that we 
may realize or conquer our essenoe. ~For Lavelle the whole ques-
tion of how we can oreate ourselves i~{ oontained in clarifying 
the association between our existence and our essence. 32 
In ~ 1 'ame humaine Lavelle maintains that the problem of the 
relationship between essence and existence was the central ques-
291E..!£. See also Lavelle, ~, p. 3t~3. 
30Lavelle, Puissances, pp. 151-152. 
31Sargi, p. 104. 
32Ecole, pp. 96, 154. 
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tion of traditional ontology. But for him the problem is meaning-
less except when referred to the problem of the human person. 33 
Although there exist different freedoms, or free bein{"s, 
which are separate and mutually exclusive, each possesses a mutual 
solidarity and union in virtu.e of its relation (by participation) 
to Pure Act, the Transcendent Free Being, God. By its very 
nature freedom is directed towards the creation of a society of 
free pers ons who, in turn, reach out to t:l:e plent tude of being, 
to God. Thus Lavelle's doctrine of the human person is closely 
dependent on his metaphysics of being. Freedom, which is received 
and orientated to others, is a participation in infinite creative 
freedom. 34 
For Lavelle "person" and ttpersonality" are but two aspects 
of one thing. "Person" indicates the power that an individual 
has of uniting himself by his own initiative in a closer parti-
cipation in the All; and "personali tyW is the participation he 
possesses from the Absolute Personality, without which the essen-
tial character of the person would be destroyed.35 
'rhe characteristic property of liberty is, then, 
to found our personality, that is to say, to 
permit us to discover and assume our original 
vocation in the interior of the All. This is the 
33De llame humaine (Paris, 1951), p. 210. 
34Acte, p'. 185. See also Copleston, S.J., pp. 122-123. 
35Sargi, p. 71. 
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only possible condition for each belnp;'s becOMing 
a focus 2! initiative •••• But personality can-
not be identified with liberty. This latter is a 
pure power which it is impossible not to actualize 
even if by discourageMent or sloth we refuse to 
employ it. But it supposes matter which is furnished 
ror it by indivlduality. The person is therefore 
the synthesis or the individual and liberty. It is 
nei ther the one nor the other •••• But t:le charac-
teristic property of the person is to take into his 
own hand the destiny of the individual, to detach 
him rrom the yoke of Interest and instinct, and to 
confer on him consciousness of his Qgeatlve power 
in regard to himself and the world. J 
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For Lavelle, the person is established in all his moral 
gravity when he assumes responsibility through the experience of 
being and through freely sharing in the act which binds him 
decisively to Pure Act. "Act is at the same time a person and the 
entrance to all personal existence.,,37 
The person is not behind impersonations or appearances, but 
in them. The mystery of the subject is not hidden away in some 
recess from which we must extractitj ,it is everywhere, aria 
3t>r,avelle, Puissances, pp. 163-164: tiLe propre de In liberte 
est done de fonder notre personnallte, c'est-a-dire de noua per-
mettre de decouvrir et d'assumer notl"e vocation originale a l'inte 
rieur du Tout. Car cela n'est possible qu'a condition que chaque 
~tre devienne un foyer d'initiative •••• Pourtant In personnal-
ita ne peut etre identifi~e avec la liberte. Celle-ci est un pur 
pouvoir qu'il est impossible de ne point mettre en oeuvre, meme si 
par decouragement ou l?ar paresse, nous en refusons l'emploi. Mals 
elle suppose une matiere qUi lui est fournie par l'individualite. 
Et la personne est justement la synthase de l'indivldu et de la 
liberte. Elle n'est ni l'un ni l'autre •••• Mais la propre de 
la personne, c'est de prendre en main la destinee de l'individu, 
de l'arracher au joug de l'inter~t et de l'instinct, de lui donner 
la conscience de son pouvoir createur a l'egard de lui-m3me et du 
monde. (Translation mine.) 
37Acte 
,7 
penetrates the totality of the ego and all its acts 11ke an 
atmosphere. 38 The person does not reside only in a state where 
will and nature are almost contused, but is rather a possession 
of the self which is continually produced, and consequently an 
ideal to be realized by moral effort, a victory to be obtained. 39 
The person is not made one with the spiritual, which is never 
given, but he makes himself into a spIrItual being, he "chooses" 
himselt. The person, therefore, is always a permanent creation 
ot the self. 
"What are the condItions which make the person? '!'here 
cannot be a person where there is no interiority, subjectivIty, 
and a secret of the being with himselt •••• There is a person 
only where there is an activity which permits the ego to consti-
tute itself with the elements Which it tinds already in itself 
but by an operation which depends only on itselt."4o 
The person indicates in the individual the power he has by 
participation of going out of his individuality in order to unite 
himself by personal initiative to the universal. "Unity, inter-
iority, initiative, responsibility, and the assumptIon of the self 
38Jean Laoroix, "A Philosopher of Acceptance," Downside 
Review, LXXI (1953), 374. (Translated from the French by Dom. 
Illtyd Trethowan.) 
39collins, p. 176. See also Lavelle, Puiasances, p. 16,. 
40Lavelle, Puissances, p. 165. (Translation mine.) 
i . 
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by the self are the elements by which act defines itse1f."4l 
They are the distinctive characteristics of the person. "The 
individual receives the dignity of the person only from the 
universal act which imparts it. n42 
It is in the presence of being that Lavelle begins philos-
op~, but this is still a confused experience that needs analysis. 
The analysis involves a series of operations, in the course of 
which our personalit,y constItutes itself. Uncovering its own 
true essence, our personality unItes itself to being, but this 
time in an intelligible act where the initial experience finds its 
explanation and aChievement.43 In the multiple relations thus 
constituted, the formation and progress of our personality becomes 
possible.44 
Our ego also constructs eternal life for itso1f, according 
to Lavelle's doctrine, and this implies our union with pure being • 
• This union, in turn, consists in an operation which founds our 
personality instead of pe~itting it to dissolve or be annihi-
lated.45 In Lavelle's own words: "All our spiritual life is 
41Aote, p. 141. (Translation mine.) 
42~. ( Transla tion mine.) 
43Puissance8, p. 15. 
44Lou18 Lavelle, "La tonotion de la pens'e," [Unpublished 
writings ot Lavelle published posthumously], Giomale di Meta-
tisioa, VII (4) (Luglio-Agosto 1952), 399. ------
45Etre, p. 49. 
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contained in the formation of our personality, which is possible 
only by the conquest and use of our liberty. It is impossible 
to separate the idea that we have of ourselves from the action 
of our liberty. It 1s by means of liberty that the ego disengages 
itself from nature and fatality, and that it becomes an original 
source of being and lite in the world, that it succeeds in making 
its actions its own and justifying them.,,46 
Only a failure to realize that we become persons not by 
keeping within individual limits but only by surpassing them, can 
account tor the refusal to allow that God is a person. For Louis 
Lavelle as for any genuine philosopher of person, God is the 
foundation of our personal being. Indeed, Lavelle has written 
that it is his absolute relation with God which gives to each 
individual, nwhatever be his Itmits or weaknesses, the mark ot 
the absolute, that is to say, which m~es a saint of him.ft~1 
Thus the influence of both existentialism and personal-
ism can easily be traced in Lavelle's philosophy. The existen-
tialist's concern with the concrete, living person who must 
46Puissanees, P. 163: "Toute notre vie spirituelle reside 
dans 1a tormatIon de notre personnalite qui n'eat possible que 
par 1& eonqu3te et l'usage de notre 1iberte. Il. eat impossible 
de separer l'idee que nous ayoos de nous-memes de ltaetion de 
notre liberte. C'eat avec 1a libert' que 1e moi ae degage de la 
nature at de 1a fatalite, qu'il devient dans 1e monde une source 
originale d t 3tre et de vie, qu'll reuBsit a faire siennes ses 
propres actions at a les justifIer." (Translation mine.) 
41Quatre Sa1nts (Paris, 1951), p. 35. (Translation m1ne.) 
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commit llimself to being and ~eality can be Been in Lavelle's 
notion of man as a being who must use the existence he has to 
shape his pe~sonal essence. This is done by means of human f~ee­
dom, whose sole pu~pose is the pe~fection of the individual 
subject who exercises it. Personalists too consider the human 
pe~son as self-dete~mining and f~ee, but they emphasize man's 
orientation to society and other persona. Strains of this can 
also be seen in Lavelle where he gives special prominence to the 
question of human communication and t~iendship. Lavelle does not 
view freedom as something merely personal but rather as something 
which Is necessarily directed to other persons. For him an 
encounter with other freedoms Is imperative it I am to bring my 
personal freedom to a fuller actualization. 
In revealing its intrinsic dependence on personalist and 
existentialist doctrines, Lavelle's thought can at the sam~ time 
be shown to be a highly pe~80nal synthesis and development of 
each of these. He llas taken various aspects of these doctrines 
and woven them into a metaphysical doctrine of being based on 
human oonsciousness and freedom. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONSCLUSION 
The present century of unbelievable scientific advances has 
also witnessed a new interest in man. flWhat is meant by 
'person'?" 1s a question that many scholars have tried to answer. 
The empirical science of psychology has not been alone in this 
quest, but modern philosophy as well has taken up the new, revi-
talized interest in mants nature. This is most clearly seen, 
perhaps, in the concern with the "personal" element of our 
concrete, immediate, daily exper1.ences which is so characteristic 
of eXistentialism, phenomenology, and personalism. 
The aim of the present thesis was to study the thought of a 
modern philosopher, Louis Lavelle, e~pecially from the po~t of 
view of his philosophical theory of person and personality. To 
do tIds, we had first to get an understanding of the philosophical 
climate in which he wrote, and a grasp of his general doctrine. 
Then, brief attention was given to some of the prominent current 
theories of person and personality in order to provide a context 
1n which to situate Lavelle's position. Now we can look back to 
glance over our steps and review the results. 
Like the philosophy of any individual, Lavelle's thought 
derives partly from a philosophical heritage, partly from his own 
oreative refleotion. Platonism, existentialism, the philosophy of 
spirit, and personalism are the roajor souroes from which Lavelle's 
doctrine flows. But the \mion of these various approa.ches to 
reality within a single philosophical synthesis is solely the work 
of the man. To him helongs the credit for a masterful attempt 
at oombining the need and value of metaphysics, the importance of 
spiritual reality, personal autono~, and participation in God's 
transcendenoe into one vital body of thought. Almost in reaotion 
to the grow1.ng tendenoy of compartmentalizing our knowledge and 
interests, Lavelle has essayed a unified body of thought which 
includes the oentral and most importallt themes of human thought. 
Lavello's philosophy, however, is not entirely tree from 
difficulties. And since the philosopher with whom we are dealing 
is primarily a metaphysician, it is not surprising that our 
d.ifficulties arise f"rom an attempt tQ Justify hit! ontologioal 
system. 
Briefly stated, our principal objection to Lavellels meta-
physics is that he fails to distinguish between act as existence 
(first act) and act as operation (second act). Lavelle makes a 
three-fold distinction of being into Pure Aot (pure intimacy), 
participated aot (union of passivity and activity), and pure 
passivity (pure exteriority, the given). In a partioipated being 
Lavelle reduces first act to second aot. This reduotion causes 
no problem 1f we are considering Pure Aot, in which there is no 
distinction between existence and operation. But when we consider 
participated being--a human person, for example--we meet an insol-
uble difficulty. Pure Act is distinguished from a finite being 
by the latterts act of participation. As a partioipating belng, 
my act is formed of both activity and passivity. But it asked 
what in me is passive and what active, Lavelle's systenl seems 
unable to fu:r-nish a.n adequate response. Nowhere can we find an 
explanation of what gives to the partioipating aot the indivld-
uality by which it is ontologically distinguished from Pure Act. 
Lavelle has failed to make Ii close stUdy or analysis of the form 
of finito being, or contingent act. This ambiguity makes the 
suspicions of pantheiMs which have been oast upon Lavelle's 
dootrine more easily understandable. 
Acoording to at least one author, this problem would not 
have arisen in Lavelle's philosoph, if he had not based his 
ontology on the :r-ejection of the real composition between sub-
stance and accidents in finite beings.''i Fearing that this dis-
tinction would lead irrevocably to the Kantlan distination 
between the noumenon and phenomenon, 1n whiah all being would be 
merely an unknown substrate for phenomenal changes of the real, 
Lavelle ooncluded that the distinction between SUbstance and 
accidents was only the projection on the real of our manner of 
IBechara Bargi, La Rartlcipatlon ! l'etre dans l! Ehilosophie ~ Louis Lavelle (ParIS, 1957), p. 150. 
':) 
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In Lavalle!s philosophy the initial experience of being 
es tablishes us iI!l!l1ediately in a dua.lism of ego (consciousness) 
and being. This dualism, however. is different from the tl"adl-
tiona.l dualism which places a reciprocal rel.ation between the 
subject and object. i.,avelle t s is a. dualism o:.~ intimacy in which 
t.h.e ago is separated fro:n being only by its self-affirmation in 
the expression of its very intimacy with baing. This self-
affirrt1a. tiOll in the human person is the VfH'Y cora of his freedom, 
and by means of participated acta of freedom wa find it possible, 
in th.e Lavellian scheme, to create ourselves and to pa.rticipate 
more and more fully in the :fullnHss of being. It would not be 
too great an exaggeration to consider Lavelle's whole philosophy 
as a desoription of the oreation of the self by the sel.f. 
We have seen that in the Lavelll!inJJletaphysic, being ~s an 
act, an act in which we both realize our own being and construct 
our proper selves th.rough free choices. In this way we at-ClUBe OU1~-
selves to conform more and more closely to the ideal imar,e of the 
human being, and thus to acquire a deeper penetration of and 
partioipation in the Trrulscendent Pure Act, God. 
2Thus it dOGS not seem quite aocurate to say, as Professor 
Collins does in his artiole on Lavelle (Philosoph1cal Rev1ew, LVI [1941], p. 165) that Lavelle's "created oreation" or self-forma-
tion in freedom is the same as Scholast1c secondary causality. 
Human creativ1ty truly partakes of the oharaoter of our mode of 
be1ng. But Scholastics and Lavelle differ in the1r metaphysical 
explanation of the human person. 
J"'rom -chis achelll8 of things the extreme value of the human 
agent can t'eadily btl seen, and hare enters the underlying concepts 
of person a11<l personality. By his llature man is capable of 
lnaking free cllOices which sinrul tane()usly cause him to realize and 
constitute hl~selr in being, as well as to Cillne into closor 
cOl"!1nr.mication with the ;)1 vine Be1n.::;* Freedom and tht3 ahill ty to 
oake c":":1.010e8, plu3 ~1.is limited part:i.cipRT;iol1 in the divIno 
essence, constitute l!'\an's di~~:nii;y: they make him a per::.on. The 
actual use Made of this ability, anu tho sort of boing which 
consequently results is ';vila t Lavelle means by per-sonali ty. V{hlle 
use of thes8 terms in this sellse is peculiar to ....avella's philos-
opt-JoY. they do serve to point (Jut the original and synthetic 
c}larac ter" of hi s thought. 
In the beginr.l.il1g of Chapter 4 we observed that the Idea of 
peI'son evolved fI'om an emphasis on th~ human subl:$ tanoe (dul.:ing 
the .Middle Ages) into the strongly psychological notion of a self-
conscious being (f'rolll Desoartes' time until the present.) Uow, 
Just as Lavelle's metaphysic;l!.r.l thought is a synthesis of ElBSen-
tlalist and existelltialist doot!'ines of being, so in the area of 
philosoprlY of person does his thought represent a union between 
the "'self ... contained" notion of person and the notion of per30n as 
a "substance". Th.e indiVIdual person, Lavelle would vigorously 
assert, is a substa.nce-and thls in known fran the Ini t~_al fact 
of unified consciousness Wllich each person experiences 1n himself. 
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But this human 8ubsta.nce only becomes a person by exercising 
l'I.imsel f in a subjective series of choices throup-.h which he umakes 
himself!! according to the pattern of an ideal human essence. Here 
enters the important concept of freedom. Only by means of my 
freedom am I able to perform consciou.s and responsible human 
actIons. Thus, and only thus, do I merit the dignity of being a 
human person. By my oommitments and strivings towards this goal. 
I more and more realize the ~111nes8 of my participated nature in 
the One Transcendent Free Being, God, the source of all being. 
Precisely here, in the special emphasis which he gives to 
human freedom, does Lavelle effect a union between the traditional 
philosophical truths of past centuries and the most deeply felt 
needs of modern man. Traditional Christian thought has always 
defend.ed man t s moral autonomy with firm philosophical princ iples. 
While materialism and scientific progI!eS8 have largely caused hIm 
to lose sight of these firm prIncIples,"modern man Is nevertheless 
keenly interested today in the psychological tact of his own free-
dom. By his philosophical synthesis Lavelle has united these 
two elements of yesterday and today. Througn his attention to 
consciousness and the necessary Qutonomy ot human volitional 
activity, La,,'elle has explained the existential fact that men 
are free beings. But his explanation i8 in terms of philosophical 
ultimates: being, act, participation, and cause.l! ty. The fact 
that he gives a metaphysical foundation to current psychological 
and existential themes seems to be the principal advantage which 
:11: 
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reoommends Lavelle's philosophy to modern thinkers. 
In asserting that essence precedes exlst~nce. Lavelle had no 
other end In view than to maintain the reality of liberty, or 
freedom, against the determinist philosophies which are so preva-
lent in the philosopllical world of today_ These philosophies 
enclose us in an immutable nature which we are unable to chanr,e in 
spite of our very best efforts. As if to answer this sort of 
philosophizing, Lavelle sometimes equates existence with liberty, 
as when he says: "existence oannot be defined otherwise than as 
liberty,") and "when treating of a tree being, that which we call 
his existence ••• is his treedom."4 
The philosophical world has much to learn from the intriguing 
writings or the modern French metaphysician whose doctrine we have 
been studying. It i. to be earnestly hoped that more thinkers wil 
turn their attention to his ideas, though they need not agree with 
everything he has written. The most stimulating thinkers in 
history have been men who have held to certain capital principles, 
and then tried to run a middle course between extremist positions. 
Lavelle may not have succeeded perfectly; indeed, no man doesJ 
But we should be grateful to him for holding firmly to our highest 
)Louis Lavelle, Introduction i l'ontologie (Paris, 1947), 
p. 34: "[L]fexistence ne peut itre d4rinie autrement que comme 
une liberte." (Translation mine.) 
4Act!, p. 96: "[Q]uand il s'agit d'un etre libre, ce que nou 
appelons son existence ••• c'est sa liberte." 
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Christian traditions, and then resolutely striking out on a path 
which would enable man to see that the natural and the super-
natural, the old and the modern are not incompatible. Everything 
participates in the All, the Supreme Person wi/hose supremely 
perfect persona11tv:. is our lifets task to imita.te. 
--------------------------------------------------------------~ --- -~--
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